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GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACH-
MENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND 
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON. By William H. 
Rehnquist.' William Morrow & Co., Inc. 1992. Reissued 
in paperback, 1999. Pp. 304. $12.00. 
Michael J. Gerhard( 
INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's is a book that was 
written well ahead of its time-almost seven years, to be precise. 
Written in 1992, Grand Inquests explores the backgrounds, de-
tails, historical contexts, and constitutional significance of the 
two most important Senate impeachment trials in the nineteenth 
century-those of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805 
and President Andrew Johnson in 1868. Presumably, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist expected at the time that he published the book 
that the topic would be a safe one for a sitting chief justice, for it 
would then have seemed highly unlikely that no similar such trial 
would have been on the horizon during the Chief Justice's ten-
ure or lifetime. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist could have rea-
sonably expected that he could write about the Chase and John-
son impeachment trials without ever having to confront the 
issues involved in them (or like proceedings) in his formal ca-
pacity. 
We now know that Chief Justice Rehnquist's interest in im-
peachment was prescient. The book became enormously signifi-
cant when, almost seven years after its publication, the House of 
Representatives impeached President William Jefferson Clinton 
for perjury and obstruction of justice on December 19, 1998, and 
in January and February of 1999, the United States Senate con-
ducted an impeachment trial of President Clinton with none 
other than Chief Justice William Rehnquist presiding. The 
House's impeachment and the Senate's trial of President Clinton 
understandably renewed interest in Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
I. Chief Justice of the United States.Supreme Court. 
2. Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. I am enormously grateful 
to Michael Stokes-Paulsen for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and patience 
and support throughout the completion of this essay. 
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book-indeed, the book had been out-of-print up until the eve 
of President Clinton's impeachment trial, at which time it was 
rushed into re-issue as a paperback. There was renewed interest 
in the book, not just for the details of and the Chief Justice's 
thoughts about two of our most important impeachment prece-
dents-including the only other presidential impeachment 
trial-but also for insights into the Chief Justice's disposition 
towards the role that he would perform in President Clinton's 
impeachment trial as the presiding officer. 
Grand Inquests is significant both for what it discusses and 
illuminates and for what it does not discuss about the federal 
impeachment process. Part I briefly examines the ways in which 
the book surveys (and in doing so satisfies contemporary read-
ers' interest in) the most significant congressional impeachment 
experiences in the nineteenth century. Part II briefly examines 
the ways in which readers' expectations might be frustrated by 
the Chief Justice's failures (thoroughly understandable in light of 
what he could not have foreseen) to discuss several issues that as 
it turns out link President Clinton's impeachment trial to, as well 
as differentiate it from, the Chase and Johnson impeachment tri-
als. Part III sketches some likely explanations for and lessons to 
be drawn from President's Clinton's impeachment and acquittal, 
particularly those that are similar to or reaffirmations of the con-
sequences of the Chase and Johnson impeachment proceedings. 
I 
To bring the Senate impeachment trials of Justice Chase 
and President Johnson to life, Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses 
in some detail the personalities of the key figures in the Senate 
proceedings, the nature of the controversies giving rise to the 
impeachments of both Chase and Johnson, the legal strategies of 
those seeking and those opposing the removals of Chase and 
Johnson, and the reasons for and significance of the acquittals of 
both Chase and Johnson. These details help to familiarize the 
uninitiated or the "nonlawyer" -the intended audience of the 
book (p. 11)-with these important historical events. 
To understand the significance of the Chase and Johnson 
impeachment trials, one needs to appreciate, as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explains, how the two trials were inseparable from the 
political issues dividing the major political parties of the times. 
The Chase trial, for instance, turned on whether in overseeing 
the sedition trials of two prominent critics of Federalist policy, 
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Associate Justice Chase, an ardent Federalist, conducted himself 
'"in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust,"' moti-
vated, at least according to the justice's critics and political op-
ponents (and, of course, the House Managers who were trying to 
remove him from office), by the base political desire to abuse his 
judicial authority in an effort to do harm to vigorous political 
foes over whose sedition trials Chase presided. (p. 59) 
The Johnson trial also featured an impeachment effort 
masking a thinly veiled effort to remove an unelected, unpopular 
president (Johnson had become president only as a result of the 
assassination of Abraham Lincoln), who time and time again 
had-at least in the opinion of the Radical Republicans in 
charge of Congress at the time-tried to substitute his personal 
will and beliefs about appropriate Reconstruction policy for that 
of Congress. The Radical Republicans in Congress had wanted 
to tie the re-entry of Southern states into the Union on granting 
certain rights (such as the vote) to the newly freed slaves, while 
Johnson, a Democrat from the South, had wanted to deny the 
vote to African-Americans and effect greater leniency towards 
and preserve the authority of the popularly elected officials of 
those southern governments. This contest of wills between 
Johnson and the Reconstruction Congress had provoked a cou-
ple of unsuccessful efforts by the House to impeach Johnson; 
(pp. 208-212) but eventually the House successfully impeached 
Johnson based on his dismissal of his Secretary of War, Edwin 
Stanton, a Radical Republican, in apparent violation of the for-
mal requirement to get Senate approval prior to ordering such 
termination as set forth in the Tenure in Office Act, an act which 
Congress had passed (like so much other Reconstruction legisla-
tion) over Johnson's veto. Johnson had vetoed the Tenure in 
Office Act because he believed it illegitimately impeded the 
President's prerogative to control the exercise of executive 
power by removing executive officers as he saw fit. Moreover, 
President Johnson viewed the act as inapplicable to his firing of 
Stanton, because he construed the act as applying only to a 
president's removal of cabinet officials whom he had initially 
nominated (Lincoln, not Johnson, had nominated Stanton). 
However, the Radical Republicans in Congress intensely dis-
agreed with Johnson over the constitutionality and the construc-
tion of the act. 
Historians have speculated a good bit about the reasons for 
the Senate's acquittals of both Justice Chase and President John-
son. Some of the more interesting portions of Grand Inquests 
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include the Chief Justice's speculations about the reasons for 
each impeached official's acquittal. A majority of the Senate-
but not a supermajority-did vote to convict and remove Justice 
Chase. Chief Justice Rehnquist explains the latter vote partly on 
the basis of "the personality and character of John Randolph," 
one of the most zealous of the House Managers who sought 
Chase's removal from office. (p. 110) Prior to Chase's trial, 
Randolph had alienated many Republican senators through his 
zealous, often personal attacks upon those who disagreed with 
him, including the President at the time of the Chase impeach-
ment, Thomas Jefferson. (Jefferson had encouraged the im-
peachment of Samuel Chase, an ardent Federalist critic of Jef-
ferson's administration.) Several senators made their antipathy 
for Randolph known to their colleagues during Chase's trial, (p. 
113) and Rehnquist surmises that "Republican senators might 
view with considerably less enthusiasm the case against Chase 
when the managers were led by John Randolph than they would 
have viewed the same case if the managers had been led by a less 
mercurial and erratic champion."3 (Id. at 113). Rehnquist 
speculates further that "one should not rule out statesmanship of 
a high order as the motivating factor in the case of some Repub-
lican senators who voted to acquit. The Federalist senators, who 
to a man voted 'Not Guilty,' were convinced that the impeach-
ment proceedings were a partisan attack by the Republicans on 
the independence of the federal judiciary-the branch of gov-
ernment that was in the hands of Federalist appointees .... 
[P]erhaps to some Republicans the demonstrated misconduct of 
Chase ... would have been grounds for removal only if it could 
have been accomplished consistently with the maintenance of an 
independent judiciary; thinking that it could not be, they ac-
cepted Chase's continuance in office as the lesser of two evils." 
(p. 113) 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also gives several reasons for Presi-
dent Johnson's acquittal. Indeed, Johnson was acquitted by the 
thinnest of margins-a single vote. Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
explanations are based on his review of a wide variety of histori-
cal materials relating to the trial, including written opinions 
submitted in explanation of their votes by 30 of the 54 senators 
who participated in Johnson's trial. (p. 240) Chief Justice 
3. Interestingly, one might see here a possible foreshadowing of a problem in 
President Ointon's impeachment trial, in which some senators were turned off by what 
they regarded as the over-heated, over-stated rhetoric of some of the House Managers. 
1999] BOOK REVIEWS 437 
Rehnquist suggests that senators acquitted because, inter alia, 
some of them disliked the person who would have succeeded to 
the presidency if Johnson were to have been removed, the Sen-
ate Pro Tern Benjamin Butler, even more than they disliked 
Johnson;4 some senators did not believe Johnson's misconduct 
constituted an impeachable offense; other senators believed 
Johnson was entitled to a good faith belief that the Tenure in Of-
fice Act did not apply to his removal of Stanton (for it applied 
only to the removals of people whom a president had nominated 
to confirmable office and Stanton had been nominated by Lin-
coln, not Johnson); and Johnson had signaled to senators that he 
would accept congressional primacy in fashioning Reconstruc-
tion. (pp. 240-47) Moreover, "the tactics of the managers from 
beginning to end undoubtedly antagonized not only senators 
who were doubtful to begin with but some who leaned toward 
conviction at the beginning of the Senate trial." (p. 247). These 
tactics (including, inter alia, waving a bloody shirt on the Senate 
floor and urging senators to "vote as you shot") included, inter 
alia, "appeal[ling] to every prejudice and passion, and r[iding] 
roughshod, when they could, over legal obstacles in their ruth-
less attempt to punish the President for his opposition to their 
plans." (p. 247, citation omitted) 
Of even greater interest to modem readers than some sena-
tors' stated or suspected reasons for acquitting Chase and John-
son is the constitutional significance of the two acquittals in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's estimation. According to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Chase's acquittal had a "profound effect on the 
American judiciary" for two reasons. (p. 114) First, he suggests, 
"it assured the independence of federal judges from congres-
sional oversight of the decisions they made in the cases that 
came before them. Second, by assuring that impeachment would 
not be used in the future as a method to remove members of the 
Supreme Court for their judicial opinions, it helped to safeguard 
the independence of that body." (Id.) 
Chief Justice Rehnquist is much more careful in pronounc-
ing his opinion on the significance of President Johnson's im-
peachment by the House and acquittal by the Senate. Johnson's 
acquittal was no sure thing; it turned on the courage of seven 
Republican senators to buck their party and short-term political 
interests and vote for acquittal-indeed, all seven would eventu-
4. During Johnon's presidency there was no formal mechanism for filing nor ad-
dressing a vacancy in the vice-presidency. 
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ally abandon or lose their seats. Chief Justice Rehnquist ob-
serves that President Johnson's impeachment reflected the 
strong resolve of Radical Republicans "to make the South pay a 
high price for its effort to dissolve the Union by force and to use 
the power of the federal government to aid the newly freed 
slaves"; (p. 250) Johnson's succession to the presidency by 
means of assassination rather than popular election or support; 
the fact that "both houses of Congress were controlled by the 
Republican party, to whose policies he was opposed"; (p. 251) 
and the strong "determination on the part of [the President and 
Congress] to insist on what [each] regarded as its institutional 
prerogatives. Johnson resolutely vetoed measures he felt were 
either wrong or unconstitutional, and he used his power of ap-
pointment to reward his friends. Congress retaliated by passing 
laws over his veto, and by enacting measures, such as the Tenure 
in Office Act ... , designed to limit the president's power of re-
moval." (p. 251) 
Chief Justice Rehnquist concludes further that, had Johnson 
not been acquitted, his conviction would have transformed im-
peachment into just another one of the many methods available 
to the Congress (such as its oversight authority over appropria-
tions or appointments) to "frustrate the president in his effort to 
carry out his program." (p. 270) In the Chief Justice's view, "the 
greatest significance of such [a transformation] for impeachment 
would have been its usefulness simply as a threat-a sword of 
Damocles, designed not to fall but to hang ... Future presidents 
of one party facing a Congress controlled by the opposite party 
[would have to] think twice about vetoing bills with which they 
disagreed, and about resisting the inevitable efforts by Congress 
to poach on the executive domain." (Id.) Thus, for Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the acquittal of President Johnson confirms that: 
Impeachment would not be a referendum on the public offi-
cial's performance in office; instead, it would be a judicial 
type of inquiry in which specific charges were made by the 
House of Representatives, evidence was received before the 
Senate, and the senators would decide whether or not the 
charges were proven. The Johnson acquittal added another 
requirement ... It was not any technical violation of the law 
that would suffice, but it was the sort of violation of the law 
that would in itself justify removal from office .... With re-
spect to the chief executive, [the acquittal has meant] that as 
to the policies he sought to pursue, he would be answerable 
only to the country as a whole in the quadrennial presidential 
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elections, and not to Congress through the process of im-
peachment. (p. 271) 
II 
439 
For anyone familiar with the history of congressional im-
peachment practices, it should not be surprising to find in the 
Chase and Johnson impeachment trials the seeds of some of the 
issues that came to characterize or dominate the impeachment 
and trial of President William Jefferson Clinton. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist touches on only a few ofthese in his book. He should 
not be faulted for not having foreseen more of these issues. 
Many of the issues that have preoccupied contemporary observ-
ers and commentators, such as the constitutionality of a so-called 
"finding of fact" or the possibility of a judicial challenge to cer-
tain aspects of impeachment proceedings, were simply not part 
of the impeachment process or on people's minds at the time of 
the historic events at the center of Rehnquist's book. After all, 
the Chief Justice's book is a work of history, not a primer for or 
treatise on presidential impeachment trials. Nevertheless, the 
very fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote his book without 
the present circumstances in mind raises reasonable curiosity 
about whether he was able to foresee or offer some dispassion-
ate insight into some of the issues that would arise in the pro-
ceedings against President Clinton. The book does not offer 
much discussion of these issues, but it does, if one reads it care-
fully, offer some useful background material. 
Take, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's assessment of 
the significance of the Chase acquittal. He copiously recounts 
the histories of efforts to use the federal impeachment process 
against presidents and federal judges prior to the Johnson and 
Chase impeachment trials, respectively, but he does not offer 
much of an account of the history of federal impeachment efforts 
after those trials (with the notable exception of analyzing the 
three articles of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary 
Committee against President Richard Nixon, whose removal 
from office Chief Justice Rehnquist considers to have been in-
evitable). (pp. 272-74) The Chief Justice regards Justice Chase's 
acquittal as cementing the congressional mind-set against using 
impeachment to punish federal judges or Supreme Court justices 
for their official decisions, but he fails to note that subsequent to 
the Chase acquittal the primary targets of federal impeachment 
efforts have been federal judges. He also does not suggest any-
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thing at all about the competency of members of either the 
House or the Senate to render informed or principled judgments 
about impeachment, an issue that has arisen more than once 
since the nineteenth century. For instance, in the aftermath of 
the three late 1980s judicial impeachment trials, some commen-
tators (including some senators) raised serious questions about 
whether senators had the interest, time, or inclination to partici-
pate meaningfully in the impeachment trials of lower court fed-
eral judges. Indeed, in the early 1990s Congress authorized the 
creation of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and 
Removal to study, inter alia, the propriety of continuing vesting 
of the constitutional authority of impeachment and removal in 
Congress. (The Commission concluded that on balance it made 
sense to keep the division of authority regarding impeachment 
within the politically accountable authorities in which the fram-
ers placed it.) 
Nor did Chief Justice Rehnquist discuss the interesting 
question whether the standards for impeaching federal judges 
(or justices) and presidents should be the same. This issue was 
on the minds of many of the members of Congress throughout 
the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton, because 
the articles of impeachment approved by the House against him 
included one charge-perjury-that had served successfully as 
the basis for removing at least two federal judges in the late 
1980s-Alcee Hastings and Walter Nixon. Moreover, a third 
federal district judge, Harry Claiborne, had been impeached and 
removed from office in 1986 based on income tax evasion (obvi-
ously a crime involving a form of lying under oath). Members of 
Congress in the nineteenth century certainly did consider the 
kinds of legal violation that would constitute an appropriate ba-
sis for impeachment, but there is little record of any explicit dis-
cussion of the comparable standards for impeaching federal 
judges (or justices) and presidents. 
One reason for this relative silence might have been that the 
charges against Justice Chase and President Johnson turned to a 
significant degree on their different responsibilities-in Chase's 
case, those of a federal judge in overseeing trials while those 
against Johnson turned on his duties to comply with a civil law 
directed at the President but that, in Johnson's opinion, either 
did not apply in the circumstances of his firing of Stanton or, if it 
did, was unconstitutional. The very fact that members of Con-
gress did not fret much, if at all, about the degree to which the 
standards for impeaching justices and presidents were the same 
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or different is telling; it reflects an important theme that has run 
throughout impeachment history-that impeachment primarily 
exists for dealing with serious abuses of power or privilege and 
thus is likely to differ to the extent that officials' different re-
sponsibilities have been involved or implicated in any given im-
peachment proceeding. The point is that the standard for im-
peachment might be the same for all officials (i.e., "other high 
crimes and misdemeanors"), but it might be applied differently, 
depending on the context in which misconduct has arisen and the 
particular responsibilities allegedly abused by the particular offi-
cial involved. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist does not discuss several other ques-
tions that intrigue contemporary observers of the impeachment 
process. These questions include, inter alia, whether the House 
should function something like a grand jury in an impeachment 
proceeding. The Chief Justice did not explicitly address this is-
sue, though it seems that implicit within his conception of the 
House's responsibility as including the formulation of specific 
charges against an impeached official might well be something 
like a grand jury or prosecutorial function. One thing that cuts 
against this conception of the House's role is that President 
Clinton's impeachment featured the most extensive discussion 
ever in the House of its function within the impeachment process 
as tantamount or similar to a grand jury. (Significantly, this con-
tention was made by only a few House Members and was never 
formally endorsed by nor articulated by a majority of House 
members.) Usually, the House has conducted its own, separate 
investigation into charges of impeachable misconduct, even in 
cases (such as those of Richard Nixon, Harry Claiborne, Alcee 
Hastings, and Walter Nixon) referred to the House by some ex-
ternal authority. Regrettably, the Chief Justice did not dwell on 
the House's proceedings in impeaching either Chase or Johnson; 
consequently, his readers do not come away from the book with 
any conception or grounding in how the House, at least in the 
nineteenth century, understood its function (in contrast to how it 
understood or performed its function on other occasions, in-
cluding the Clinton impeachment). 
The Chief Justice's book is silent on other issues that did 
not arise explicitly in any impeachment proceedings prior to the 
1970s. Of particular significance is the question of the appropri-
ate burden of proof in the House as well as the Senate. An issue 
that arose first in the impeachment inquiry against William 0. 
Douglas in 1970 and a few years later against Richard Nixon had 
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to do with the degree to which an impeachable official could be 
impeached and removed from office for misbehavior not for-
mally nor strictly related to his or her official duties. The House 
refused to approve any formal inquiry against Douglas based on 
his lifestyle (or, for that matter, on his judicial decisions), con-
firming the Chief Justice's assessment of the lasting significance 
of Chase's acquittal; and the House Judiciary Committee refused 
to approve an article of impeachment against Richard Nixon 
based on tax fraud. Private misconduct for the first time became 
clearly an appropriate basis for impeachment and removal when 
the House impeached and the Senate removed Harry Claiborne 
from his federal district judgeship in 1986 for tax evasion. Clai-
borne's impeachment helped to blur the line between the public 
and the private, such that President Clinton's misconduct be-
came, in the view of many, fair game for impeachment andre-
moval from office. 
Another recent development that has become important to 
the impeachment process, but that did not figure into either the 
Chase or Johnson impeachments, has had to do with the innova-
tions made by the Twelfth Amendment (which arguably helped 
to transform the President into a popularly elected official as 
opposed to one that had been primarily chosen by the Electoral 
College) and Seventeenth Amendment (which changed the way 
in which Senators were elected, from being chosen by their re-
spective state legislatures to the citizenry of their respective 
states). No doubt, the degree to which these amendments have 
made all federal officials directly accountable to the electorate 
has introduced a dynamic into the federal impeachment process 
that did not make any difference to the outcomes of the Chase 
and Johnson impeachment efforts. In contrast, Richard Nixon 
became the first elected president to have been subjected to a 
serious impeachment inquiry, while William Jefferson Clinton 
became the first elected president to have been formally im-
peached. In their defenses, both presidents raised the arguments 
that their respective popular elections should not be lightly over-
turned nor disregarded in the impeachment process. Indeed, 
President Clinton was able to muster high popularity ratings that 
undoubtedly helped to put pressure on senators not just to ac-
quit the President but also to end his trial as quickly as possible. 
President Clinton's trial dramatically illustrated some of the 
ways (which I explore in more detail in Part III} in which the 
Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments have made senators 
more sensitive to the electorate's preferences. 
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Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist does not discuss the 
constitutionality or significance of censure in his book. This is a 
little surprising, because censure was very much a nineteenth 
century phenomenon, though it seems to have fallen out of 
vogue in the twentieth century. Interestingly, the House of Rep-
resentatives passed resolutions (in one form or another) that 
censured, rebuked, or reprimanded Presidents John Tyler, James 
Polk, and James Buchanan, while the Senate censured (but later 
expunged the resolution against) President Andrew Jackson. 
(This is not to mention almost a dozen other resolutions passed 
by the House or the Senate critical in some fashion of other 
high-ranking governmental officials.) As Congress's devices for 
checking presidential (and other high-ranking officials) missteps 
have grown, the need for censure seems to have diminished. In 
addition, the eventual expungement of President Jackson's cen-
sure demonstrated to some its futility as a measure of lasting re-
buke. Nevertheless, censure was a meaningful alternative to im-
peachment for many members of Congress (particularly 
Democrats) throughout the impeachment proceedings against 
President Clinton, and any sequel to Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
book will have to address the arguments made for and against 
censure in President Clinton's impeachment proceedings 
Of course, one cannot leave a discussion of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's book without considering whether and, if so, how he 
would figure as a character in any sequel. No doubt, he will not 
write it. Just as he has avoided any extra-judicial commentary 
on his function as an associate justice and a chief justice, he will 
in all likelihood avoid writing about his own performance as the 
second chief justice to have presided over a presidential im-
peachment trial. As the presiding officer in President Clinton's 
presidential impeachment trial, Chief Justice Rehnquist demon-
strated a great sensitivity to adhering to and respecting Senate 
procedures and precedents. No one understood better than the 
Chief Justice that the impeachment trial was the Senate's to 
conduct as it saw fit. Thus, he helped in his own way to confirm 
one of the most important lessons that he has identified as hav-
ing been initially established in the nineteenth century grand in-
quests-that the Senate has by virtue of its complete authority to 
structure and conduct impeachment trials as it sees fit the oppor-
tunity to vindicate or defend constitutional principles that are as 
important to defining the relations between the branches as any 
opinion rendered by the other court over which the Chief Justice 
presides. 
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III 
Perhaps the most important question raised by Grand In-
quests is whether the lessons the Chief Justice has identified as 
lying at the heart of past grand inquests have helped to guide the 
present generation through its most recent grand inquest. The 
answer, at least tentatively, seems to be only to a limited degree. 
In the more than hundred years after the impeachment trial of 
President Andrew Johnson, impeachments have not realized the 
kinds of dangers that Chief Justice Rehnquist foresaw as possi-
bly resulting from the conviction of President Johnson. Never-
theless, in the past 25 years, this nation has witnessed more seri-
ous impeachment proceedings attempts-at least six-than it has 
experienced in any other comparable (25-year) period in our his-
tory.5 Indeed, of the six attempts initiated in this 25-year period, 
the President has been the subject of two. 
Explaining President Clinton's impeachment and acquittal 
in light of the American experience with grand inquests is no 
simple task. Here I can only begin to sketch some possible ex-
planations for the event. For instance, as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist did with respect to President Johnson's acquittal, one 
could explain the outcome in President Clinton's impeachment 
trial in terms of the stated reasons that senators have given for 
casting their acquittal votes. The most serious problem with re-
lying on such statements is that not all senators produced them. 
Only 72 senators published such statements. These 72 included 
only 34 of the 45 Democratic senators who voted not guilty on 
both articles of impeachment, 4 of the 5 Republicans who voted 
not guilty on both impeachment articles, and 3 of the 5 Republi-
cans who voted not guilty on the first but guilty on the second 
article of impeachment. Of those 39 senators who published 
statements on their reasons for voting not guilty on both articles, 
more than half-27-explained that they did not regard the mis-
conduct alleged in either article of impeachment approved by 
the House as constituting an impeachable offense.6 Sixteen of 
5. The six officials were Presidents Nixon and Ointon and former judges Henry 
Oaibome, Walter Nixon, Alcee Hastings, and Robert Collins. Three of these officials 
(Oaibome, Walter Nixon, and Hastings) were formally impeached and removed from 
office; two (Richard Nixon and Robert Collins) resigned from office before being for-
mally impeached; and only one (President Ointon) was acquitted. 
6. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Akaka, Boxer, Biden, 
Breaux, Bryan, Oeland, Collins, Dorgan, Durbin, Graham, Harkin, Hollings, Jeffords, 
Johnson, Kennedy, Kerry, Kohl, Lincoln, Leahy, Lieberman, Levin, Mikulski, Moynihan, 
Reid, Sarbanes, Snowe, Wellstone, and Wyden (all released into the Congressional Rec-
ord on February 12, 1999). 
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the 39-all Democrats-explained that the Republicans' parti-
sanship in conducting the impeachment proceedings in the 
House affected their votes,7 while fourteen (joined by Republi-
can Arlen Specter) explained that the House Managers had not 
proven the misconduct alleged in either article of impeachment.8 
Two Republican senators indicated that they had voted not 
guilty on the first article of impeachment (and guilty on the sec-
ond article) even though they believed that all charges against 
the President had been proven,9 while another Republican sena-
tor, Fred Thompson, explained that he had voted not guilty on 
the first article (but guilty on the second) based on his belief that 
the former was impossible to defend against because it was 
vague and did not specify the statements in which the President 
had allegedly perjured himself.10 
These numbers hardly tell the full story of the President's 
impeachment and acquittal. Consequently, one could try to ex-
plain the event further in partisan terms. Notably, all 35 votes to 
convict the President on the first article and all 50 votes to con-
vict him on the second article were cast by Republicans. Over 
95% of the votes cast in the House to impeach the President 
were cast by Republicans. Yet, Senate Democrats arguably 
acted in at least as partisan a fashion as did the Republicans. At 
the outset of the impeachment trial, it was clear that if the 45 
Senate Democrats were to vote as or close to a block in opposi-
tion to the President's removal it would be numerically impossi-
ble for him to be convicted. In fact, no Democratic senator 
bolted from his or her party to vote for either article of im-
7. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Akaka, Biden, Boxer, 
Bryan, Dodd, Dorgan, Durbin, Harkin, Hollings, Kennedy, Lautenberg, Leahy, Moyni-
han, Sarbanes, Wellstone, and Wyden (released into the Congressional Record on Feb-
ruary 12, 1999). 
8. See Published Statements of Senators Akaka, Biden, Dodd, Durbin, Edwards, 
Feingold, Kennedy, Lautenberg, Levin, Mikulski, Murray, Rockefeller, Sarbanes, Spec-
ter, and Wyden (released into the Congressional Record on February 12, 1999). Senator 
Robb explained that he voted not guilty on the first article, because he did not believe 
that the House Managers had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the President had 
committed perjury in his grand jury testimony; but he voted not guilty on the second arti-
cle because it illegitimately bundled so many charges together that defending against it 
was a virtual impossibility. In Senator Robb's opinion, the second article was drafted in 
such a way to allow at least two-thirds of the Senate to vote in favor of it though most 
would have disagreed over the specific misconduct for which they were voting to remove 
the President. See Published Statement of Senator Charles Robb (released into the 
Congressional Record on February 12, 1999). 
9. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Gorton and Stevens (re-
leased into the Congressional Record on Feb. 12, 1999). 
10. See Fred Thompson, Senate Trial of Clinton Is Over, and It's Time to Move On, 
Knoxville News-Sentinel (Feb. 15, 1999), available at 1999 WL 9155314. 
446 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 16:433 
peachment, while ten bolted from the Republican contingent to 
vote against the first article and five Republicans voted against 
the second article of impeachment. 
Yet another possible explanation for the President's acquit-
tal is the unprecedented impact of the public and the media on 
the impeachment proceedings. First, the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings are the first in which the public's preferences helped 
to drive the final outcome. Throughout the President's im-
peachment trial, his approval ratings held steady at or near 
67%.u Similarly, a majority of Americans throughout the pro-
ceedings steadily opposed the President's removal from office. 
(In contrast, the Senate's acquittal of President Johnson opposed 
the public's preferences.) Yet, more than 70% of the American 
people believe that the President was guilty of the misconduct 
charged in the first article;12 and 67% believe that he had vio-
lated various laws. 13 These statistics can be reconciled on the 
ground that, as one poll found, 76% of the American people be-
lieve that the case against the President involved purely private 
misconduct that should not have been made the basis for his im-
peachment.14 Another poll found most of the public did notre-
gard the charges made against the President as constituting ap-
propriate grounds for his removal.15 In other words, most of the 
public did not regard the President's as constituting impeachable 
misconduct. The Democrats' steady opposition to the Presi-
dent's removal plainly followed the preferences of most Ameri-
cans. 
Moreover, the media's coverage might have had four effects 
on the public (or at least the 61% of the public that regularly 
followed the hearings) and, through public opinion, on the 
members of Congress. First, it might have served as a constant 
reminder to the public as well as members of Congress, particu-
larly senators, of the House Managers' difficulty of arguing con-
vincingly that the President had breached the public trust-a 
II. See, e.g., Mark z. Barabak, The Times Poll, The Los Angeles Times Al (Jan. 
31, 1999). 
12. See Josh Getlin, The Truce Behind the Culture Wars; Values: Shrill Clinton De-
bate Drowns Out Broad American Consensus on Most Issues, The Los Angeles Times Al 
(Feb. 7, 1999) (reporting the finding of a "recent" USA Today/CNN poll that 79% of the 
public "believed the president committed perjury"), available at 1999 WL 2127851. 
13. ld. 
14. Id. 
15. Kenneth T. Wald, et al., The Price of Victory, U.S. News & World Report 26 
(Feb. 22, 1999) (reporting that 55%'of those polled did not believe Ointon's behavior 
was serious enough to warrant his removal from office). 
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classic prerequisite for impeachment-as long as the public did 
not regard its trust with the President as having been breached. 
Second, the media's constant airing of bashing of the President's 
integrity throughout his presidency (particularly for the more 
than nine months that preceded the formal impeachment inquiry 
against the President) might have lowered the public's expecta-
tions regarding the President's integrity. New allegations of 
presidential misconduct would not have surprised much of the 
public nor shifted its basic opinion of the President. Third, the 
media's obsession with finding the next Watergate might have 
increased the public's skepticism over the likelihood that the im-
peachment proceedings against the President had uncovered it. 
The rhetoric with which the media characterized every new 
scandal of the Clinton White House-Filegate, Travelgate, 
MonicaGate, Koreagate, Whitewater-had been phrased to 
liken President Clinton's scandals to those of Richard Nixon, but 
the public found the comparisons wanting. The repeated at-
tempts to liken the President's scandals to Watergate, particu-
larly before full investigations had been launched, might have 
led much of the public to conclude that the President's harshest 
critics and the proponents of his impeachment were akin to the 
boy who cried wolf. Fourth, the media's comprehensive cover-
age might simply have bored the public. Prolonging the hearings 
held little, if any, prospect that anything new would happen. In 
virtually every poll, the vast majority of Americans indicated 
that they were sick and tired of the trial by the time it was over. 
As reported by the media (and reflected in phone calls, faxes, 
and e-mail to members of Congress), the public's exasperation if 
not boredom with the trial, coupled with the public's steady op-
position to removal of the President, intensified pressure to end 
the hearings. 
As one moves from possible explanations for the President's 
impeachment and acquittal to the likely lessons that will be 
drawn from the experience, the focus of the inquiry shifts. In 
analyzing both Justice Chase's and President Johnson's im-
peachments and acquittals, Chief Justice Rehnquist took this 
step in his book. This step requires a shift in focus from relying 
primarily on empirical data to determining how subsequent gen-
erations, particularly subsequent congresses, have understood 
the significance of each previous grand inquest. Obviously, we 
can only speculate about the range of possible lessons or conse-
quences of the President's impeachment and acquittal, based on 
some of the spin that already is being applied to the event (by 
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those for and against the President's removal) and the conse-
quences that roughly similar events have had in the past. It of 
course remains to be seen which lessons will withstand the test of 
time and which consequences do in fact arise. 
First, the Democrats' uniform opposition to the President's 
conviction highlights the enormous difficulty (if not the impossi-
bility) of securing a conviction in a presidential impeachment 
trial as long as the senators from the President's party unani-
mously stand by him. Rarely does a political party dominate 
more than two-thirds of the seats in the Senate. Hence, the so-
lidity of the Democratic ranks in President Clinton's impeach-
ment trial dramatically illustrated that removal of a president is 
possible only if the misconduct is sufficiently compelling to draw 
support from both sides of the aisle for a conviction. In the ab-
sence of bipartisan support for removal, acquittal is virtually 
guaranteed. (The likelihood of this result is also a consequence 
of the constitutional requirement that at least two-thirds of the 
Senate must vote to convict in order for a removal to occur. The 
supermajority requirement makes conviction and removal highly 
unlikely, for it is no easy task to get such a high degree of con-
sensus among senators, particularly when the stakes are so high. 
When such consensus is achieved, it is likely to be the result of a 
very compelling and credible case for conviction and removal.) 
Second, the President's acquittal might have shown that im-
peachment is not an effective check against the misconduct of a 
popular president. It is quite feasible that the President's acquit-
tal might have the consequence of leaving subsequent genera-
tions uncertain as to whether Congress will have the resolve in 
any future impeachment proceeding against a president with 
high approval ratings. The congressional investigation into Wa-
tergate took more than two years, before the "smoking gun"-
the tapes of certain conversations in the White House-that led 
to President Nixon's resignation was discovered.16 The Clinton im-
peachment trial took only a month, and the entire impeachment 
proceedings against President Clinton are among the shortest in 
history (with the shortest being Harry Claiborne's in 1986, last-
ing only four months from start to finish). Even so, that was too 
long for most people. While it is true that most people did not 
believe President Clinton's case involved legitimately impeach-
able offenses, some investigations might not uncover seriously 
16. See generally Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Rich-
ard Nixon 187-527 (Knopf, 1990). 
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problematic misconduct (insofar as the public is concerned) for 
some time. Future congresses might think twice before engaging 
in a relatively prolonged investigation of a President's miscon-
duct, for fear that it might alienate the public. (In this respect, 
the Clinton impeachment proceedings could be viewed as 
strengthening rather than weakening the office of the presi-
dency.) The Clinton impeachment proceedings raise a question 
about just how serious the misconduct of a popular president 
must be to convince a majority of Americans to support remov-
ing him from office. It is possible that impeachment will be ef-
fective only for the kinds of misconduct that can galvanize the 
public to set aside its approval of a president's performance to 
support resignation or formal removal. Indeed, a future Con-
gress might support removal only if it has direct evidence of very 
serious wrongdoing and unambiguous consensus (in Congress 
and among the public) on the gravity of such wrongdoing. 
Third, President Clinton's impeachment proceedings might 
have underscored the greater vulnerability to impeachment and 
removal of those officials who lack a president's resources or 
popularity. It is conceivable that an unpopular president such as 
Andrew Johnson might meet a different fate in an age in which 
the media constantly applies pressure to investigate a president's 
misconduct (or conduct that has made him unpopular) and in 
which polls indicate widespread popular support for removal. In 
this circumstance, removal or resignation might be extremely 
likely. (To date, the only instance like this occurred during the 
final days of Richard Nixon's presidency, when the public for the 
first and only time during the Watergate investigation expressed 
support for the President's ouster based on information revealed 
in the Watergate tapes.) The dynamic is likely to be even more 
problematic for a federal judge, including a Supreme Court jus-
tice, whose hearings are not likely to get anything near the wide-
spread media coverage that President Clinton's proceedings got, 
nor the outpouring of public support (or the public's opposition 
to the prolongation of hearings). In the absence of these factors, 
a federal judge or other low-profile official simply lacks the re-
sources available to a president (particularly a popular one) in 
defending against political retaliation in the form of an im-
peachment. 
Fourth, the Clinton impeachment proceedings serve as a 
dramatic reminder that the burden in an impeachment proceed-
ing is on the advocates or proponents of impeachment to show 
that the charges have not been based on nor motivated by parti-
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sanship. 17 No doubt, a proponent of President Clinton's im-
peachment and removal might argue the charges were not based 
on partisanship but rather the needs to protect the integrity of 
the judicial system and to ensure the President's compliance with 
his oath of office (even in a civil lawsuit whose focus in unrelated 
to his official duties). Yet, those charging Justice Chase and 
President Johnson with impeachable misconduct argued the very 
same thing; they claimed that the charges against those officials 
were based on those officials' respective abuse of authority and 
not on partisanship. Ultimately, those seeking the removals of 
President Johnson and Justice Chase failed to carry their bur-
dens (for a critical mass of senators and for posterity). Similarly, 
those seeking President Clinton's removal from office have 
failed (thus far) to convince most Americans (as well as any 
Democrat in the Senate) that their charges against the President 
were not based on nor motivated to a significant degree by parti-
san dislike for the President. 
The latter failure increases the likelihood that subsequent 
generations will not look kindly upon the House's judgment to 
impeach President Clinton. As I have indicated, there were 
similar failures with respect to Chase's and Johnson's impeach-
ment, and the majority vote cast in favor of convicting both offi-
cials did not preclude either's impeachment from being subse-
quently viewed as lacking political legitimacy by subsequent 
generations and congresses. Johnson's and Chase's acquittals 
have each had the effect of dissuading subsequent congresses 
from bringing or initiating impeachments based on similar mis-
conduct. Subsequent congresses have been able to take such 
postures in part because the outcomes in Chase's and Johnson's 
trials did not turn on disputes about the underlying facts. Virtu-
ally everyone at the time agreed on the facts, but they disagreed 
over the significance of the facts. Unencumbered with having to 
resolve factual disputes, subsequent generations (and con-
gresses) have been free to provide their own assessments of the 
legal and constitutional significance of the facts (and thus of 
Chase's and Johnson's misconduct). They have concluded that 
the misconduct targeted in each impeachment did not warrant 
removal from office.18 
17. See Federalist 65 (Hamilton) in Garry Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers 381-82 
(Bantam 1987). 
18. To be sure, the historical version as set forth in Chief Justice Rehnquist's book 
of the significance of President Johnson's impeachment as a thoroughly partisan effort by 
some members of Congress to increase congressional power at the expense of the presi-
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By similar reasoning, the Clinton acquittal could be con-
strued by subsequent Congresses as a rejection of the House's 
judgment on the impeachability of the President's misconduct. 
For one thing, the vote to impeach the President was (as it was in 
Chase's and Johnson's cases) largely cast along party lines, while 
there has been relatively widespread perception (at least among 
the public) that the proceedings generally were conducted and 
resolved on partisan grounds.19 Moreover, most people (includ-
ing most members of Congress) do not disagree much, if at all, 
about the underlying facts in President Clinton's case; they dis-
agree over the legal significance of the facts. Subsequent con-
gresses might conclude that if such misconduct could not merit a 
conviction in one case (i.e., Clinton's), it would be inconsistent 
or unfair to allow it to become the basis for a conviction in an-
other case. In addition, subsequent members of Congress could 
conclude that if a majority vote by the Senate to convict both 
Chase and Johnson could not save either's impeachment from 
being regarded as illegitimate, the absence of a majority vote in 
the Senate for either article of impeachment against President 
Clinton (coupled with other criticisms of it) could be viewed as 
an even rounder rejection of the legitimacy of the House's case 
than were the Senate votes in Chase's and Johnson's trials. 
Perhaps one of the most important consequences of Presi-
dent Clinton's impeachment and trial is that it affirmed the 
House's and the Senate's final, nonreviewable discretion to con-
duct its respective impeachment proceedings. In the course of 
President Clinton's impeachment proceedings, both the House 
and the Senate followed the holding in Nixon v. United States,20 
in which the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that challenges 
dency is not one on which all historians would agree. For instance, Michael Les 
Benedict, in his well-regarded study of the Johnson impeachment, suggested that the ef· 
fort to impeach and remove Johnson from office was not necessarily illegitimate because 
of Johnson's repeated violations of statutes that had been passed by the Congress over 
his veto and Johnson's efforts to weaken the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Michael Les Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (Nor-
ton, 1973). Nevertheless, the understanding of the constitutional significance of John-
son's acquittal, as reflected in Grand Inquests, probably remains the dominant historical 
understanding of the event. Perhaps more importantly, it was the understanding that 
most members of Congress indicated that they had during the Ointon trial, an under-
standing that obviously helped to shape these members' understanding of impeachment 
generally. 
19. See, e.g., Hotline (Feb. 16, 1999) (reporting that ABC had determined 71% of 
the public believed "that Senators based their votes on partisan politics rather than facts" 
and that other news devices had made similar findings), available at Westlaw 2/16199 
APN-H040). 
20. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). 
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to the constitutionality of Senate impeachment trial procedures 
are nonjusticiable. The Court left to the Senate the final, nome-
viewable authority to devise impeachment trial procedures as it 
saw fit. Consequently, the House and the Senate took great lib-
erties in fashioning their respective impeachment proceedings 
against President Clinton as each saw fit. For example, in rela-
tively controversial decisions, the House decided (for only the 
third time in history) not to call any live witnesses or otherwise 
undertake any independent fact-finding,21 to hold a final vote on 
the impeachment articles in a lame duck session,22 and to forego 
21. The first instance in American history in which the House did not take any live 
testimony or undertake independent fact-finding was the House's impeachment of Presi-
dent Johnson. This parallel between the Qinton and Johnson proceedings undercuts the 
characterization of the House's action as primarily or largely nonpartisan. For the John-
son impeachment remains widely regarded as one of the most partisan in history and thus 
serves as a dubious precedent for the Ointon impeachment to have followed. 
Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee's decision to forego such live testimony 
in its investigation of President Qinton contrasts with the widely respected move by the 
House Judiciary Committee in its investigation of President Nixon's misconduct to take 
live testimony from nine witnesses behind closed doors, even though a special prosecutor 
had referred evidentiary materials to the committee. The deviation from the latter 
precedent in President Qinton's case is another move by the House Judiciary Committee 
that provided a useful basis for attack by the President's defenders on the neutrality of 
the House's proceedings. 
The only other instance in which the House failed to undertake any independent 
fact-finding prior to impeaching an official was its impeachment of Harry Qaibome (re-
ferred to the House by the Judicial Conference of the United States). Judge Qaibome 
agreed to forego fact-finding by the House to hasten his impeachment by the House and 
what he expected would be a full trial (and ultimate vindication) in the Senate. 
22. In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Yale Law Professor 
Bruce Ackerman made the provocative argument that by impeaching the President in a 
lame duck session the House had violated the Twentieth Amendment. See Impeach-
ment Inquiry: William Jefferson Qinton, President of the United States: Presentation on 
Behalf of the President: Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105'" 
Cong. 37 (1998) (testimony of Bruce Ackerman). The argument got a lot of attention 
from the media but won no supporters in Congress. First, the text of the amendment 
does not clearly forbid such actions. Second, Professor Ackerman's argument is under-
cut by the fact that several earlier impeachments (one as recently as 1988-89) had been 
carried over from one congress to the next. These two factors led Professor Ackerman to 
shift his argument to maintaining (1) that lame duck impeachments are generally a bad 
idea and (2) a lame duck impeachment might be legitimate only if, like a piece of legisla-
tion passed in an earlier Congress, the House were to reaffirm it in a subsequent congress 
prior to the Senate's acting upon it. The second argument is also undercut by the fact 
that several impeachment trials involved "carryover" impeachments. Moreover, im-
peachment is arguably a more complete act than legislation passed only by a single 
house. Last but not least, Thomas Jefferson, in his influential manual on parliamentary 
practice drafted while he was Vice-President, maintained that the American system fol-
lowed the British practice in which impeachments carried over from one Parliament to 
the next. See Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Section 
620, reprinted in H.R. Doc. 104-272, at 313 (1997). Nevertheless, Ackerman's argument 
served as a reminder that by impeaching the President in a lame duck session the House 
arguably had put at risk some of the political (as opposed to constitutional) legitimacy of 
its impeachment judgment. 
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defining or adopting a uniform standard for defining the im-
peachability of certain misconduct. In the House, the members 
also decided for themselves such questions as the applicability of 
the Fifth Amendment due process clause, the appropriate bur-
den of proof, and the propriety of allowing three of their col-
leagues to cast votes on the articles even though each had been 
elected to the Senate and would have the opportunity to sit in 
judgment on the President in his impeachment trial. In the latter 
proceeding, senators decided for themselves such procedural 
questions as the appropriate burden of proof, the applicable 
rules of evidence (including the need for live testimony), the ap-
propriate standard for determining the impeachability of the 
President's misconduct, and the propriety of holding closed door 
hearings on a variety of issues (including the final debates on the 
President's guilt or innocence.) 
Yet another possible consequence of the Clinton impeach-
ment proceedings is that they could be construed as confirming 
there are different standards for impeaching presidents and 
judges. An argument made on behalf of the President in the 
House and the Senate was that there are different standards for 
impeaching presidents and judges based on the officials' differ-
ent tenure and responsibilities. Judges serve only "during good 
Behavior"23 and thus arguably could be removed for misbehavior 
that includes but is not necessarily limited to impeachable of-
fenses.24 Moreover, presidents are elected, and thus the electoral 
process arguably operates as the primary check against a presi-
dent's abuse of power. Since a president presumably will return 
to private life after his term, he is available in a way a judge will 
not be to be held accountable for both civil and criminal miscon-
duct at a time when it will not interfere with his official duties. 
Several factors cut against inferring that Congress endorsed 
different standards for impeaching different officials from the 
President's acquittal. First, the constitutional language is uni-
form.25 Second, the assertion is counter-historical. It conflicts 
with the Founders' obvious intention to adopt the phrase "dur-
ing good Behavior" to distinguish judicial tenure (life) from the 
23. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 1. 
24. For a more elaborate articulation of this argument (and the counter·argument), 
see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and His· 
torica/ Analysis 83-86 (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
25. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice-President, and all civil Offi-
cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Con-
viction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."). 
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tenure of elected officials (such as the President) rather than to 
establish the particular terms of judicial removae6 Moreover, 
the argument that the Constitution establishes different stan-
dards for impeaching presidents and judges was never raised 
prior to the latter quarter of the 20th century. (President John-
son, for instance, never made such a claim, though his impeach-
ment had been preceded by four judicial impeachments, includ-
ing Samuel Chase's.) Third, allowing judges to be removed for 
misbehavior that falls short of an impeachable offense undercuts 
the constitutional safeguards against political retaliation against 
judges for doing their jobs. The constitutional structure ceases 
to make much sense if judges may be removed either through 
the cumbersome, difficult process of impeachment for impeach-
able offenses, or an easier, looser process (administered by Con-
gress or by others such as judges) for misbehavior that does not 
rise to the level of an impeachable offense. Fourth, the fact that 
the consequences that might ensue from an attempt to impeach a 
president might be different from those that might result from 
the removal of a judge is not a basis for finding different consti-
tutional standards for impeaching presidents and judges. The 
consequences of an impeachment are plainly relevant as factors 
to be taken into account in the course of applying the operative 
standard, but they do not necessarily justify different standards 
altogether. In addition, of the 17 senators who expressed an 
opinion about this issue in the Clinton impeachment trial, eleven 
(ten Republicans and one Democrat) took the position that the 
same standard applies for impeaching presidents and federal 
judges.27 
Regardless of whether subsequent generations will construe 
the Clinton impeachment proceedings as confirming that there 
are different standards for impeaching presidents and judges, 
they will surely ponder what particular standard, if any, the 
Clinton proceedings endorsed for determining the impeachabil-
ity of the President's misconduct. To be sure, neither the House 
nor the Senate formally endorsed a specific standard of im-
peachment. Instead, it appears that there were almost as many 
26. See Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at 83-84 (cited in note 24). 
27. For the senators who publicly supported different standards for impeaching 
presidents and judges, see Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Biden, Breaux, 
Kerry, Kohl, Robb, and Sarbanes (released into the Congressional Record on Feb. 12, 
1999). For senators who published statements opposing the latter view, see Published 
Statements of Senators Allard, Bond, Brown back, Fitzgerald, Frist, Gorton, Grams, Ker-
rey, Kyl, Mack, and McConnell (released into the Congressional Record on Feb. 12, 
1999). 
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standards for determining the impeachability of the President's 
misconduct as they were members of both chambers voting on 
the articles of impeachment. 
Nevertheless, the Clinton impeachment serves as a re-
minder of the Framers' expectations that Congress would de-
termine on a case-by-case basis the misconduct that constituted 
"other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. "28 The constitutional 
standard was designed to narrow the range of impeachable of-
fenses from that which was available in England (where there 
were no restrictions on the scope of impeachable offenses),29 but 
the standard still remains rather broad. The Constitution con-
templates that an impeachable offense is a political crime about 
whose essential elements the framers disagreed (with the excep-
tion of such general preconditions such as serious injury to the 
republic). Consequently, every impeachment (including the 
most recent one) has featured a debate over whether the mis-
conduct charged constitutes a political crime. As these debates 
have shown, it is practically impossible to get the House or the 
Senate to adopt a uniform standard for determining the im-
peachability of misconduct. The resolution of these debates 
tracks the historic practice in which each member decides for 
himself or herself the proper resolution of a series of procedural 
issues. The debates over the proper definition of impeachable 
offenses in Congress have thus featured tugs of war in which 
those seeking impeachment argue for relatively broad, amor-
phous standards that they can show have been easily met in a 
given case and those opposing impeachment argue for very nar-
row standards that they claim have not been met in the specific 
circumstances of the case before them. 
While the debates over the scope of impeachable offenses in 
particular cases have not produced consensus among senators 
requiring guidelines, the Senate's judgments in impeachment tri-
als do reveal an interesting pattern. The seven federal officials 
whom the Senate has convicted and removed from office (all 
federal judgeships) have had in common misconduct that (1) has 
caused a serious injury to the republic and (2) has had a nexus . 
between the official's misconduct and the official's formal du-
ties.30 In assessing the latter, members of Congress have taken 
28. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 4. 
29. See generally Hearing before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 105'' Cong. 46-49 
(1999) (statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt). 
30. See generally id. at 54-56. 
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into account the degree to which certain misconduct has been 
completely incompatible with or completely disabled an official. 
In President Clinton's impeachment trial, several senators ex-
plained their acquittal votes on the absence of one or more of 
these elements.31 
Yet another possible consequence of President Clinton's 
impeachment is that it might have left much of the public with 
the impression that impeachment is just another political event. 
Indeed, over 70% of the American people believed that the 
President's im~achment trial had been resolved largely on par-
tisan grounds. This outcome is not what the Framers wanted. 
For instance, in Federalist Number 65, Alexander Hamilton ex-
pressed the hope that senators in an impeachment trial would 
rise above the passions of the moment to do what is in the best 
interests of the Constitution or the nation.33 Arguably, Johnson's 
acquittal is an example of such altruism. In contrast, the Clinton 
impeachment proceedings posed a different dynamic from the 
one that Hamilton explained the founders had tried to guard 
against. The founders were primarily concerned with a circum-
stance in which the public pressured Congress to remove a 
president (and senators resisted), but the Founders did not fore-
see (nor, at the very least, discuss) a situation in which the public 
largely opposed while many members of Congress intensely sup-
ported removal. Interestingly, the Senate's failure to convict 
President Clinton followed popular sentiment, but it did not win 
the respect of the American people. The proceedings generally 
weakened the public's confidence in Congress.34 
It is possible that one facet of the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings that reduced most people's confidence in govern-
ment to operate in a neutral manner is the fate of censure. Cen-
sure failed for several reasons, including the argument that led 
Republican leaders in the House and the Senate to preclude a 
separate vote on censure-i.e., the Constitution recognizes only 
one means-impeachment-for dealing with a President's mis-
conduct. This argument might have struck many people as dis-
31. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Oeland, Dorgan, Jeffords, 
Johnson, Kerrey, Kohl, Lautenberg, Lieberman, Lincoln, Mikulski, Reid (released into 
the Congressional Record on Feb. 12, 1999). 
32. See note 19. 
33. See Federalist 65 (Hamilton) in Gary Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers 380-81 
(Bantam, 1987). 
34. See David S. Broder and Dan Baltz, Squabbling Sinks· Views of Congress, The 
Arizona Republic (Feb. 13, 1999), available at 1999 WL 4152239. 
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ingenuous (indeed, most Americans supported censure as anal-
ternative to impeachment throughout the proceedings35). First, 
the argument that impeachment is the only means for dealing 
with a President's misconduct missed the point. The argument 
for censure was that it was a legitimate option for dealing with a 
president's misconduct that did not rise to the level of an im-
peachable offense. Impeachment has no bearing whatsoever on 
what Congress may do with respect to the latter category of mis-
conduct, for it exists as the exclusive mechanism available to 
Congress for removing a president for impeachable misconduct. 
Second, the Constitution clearly allows senators individually (by 
virtue of the First Amendment and the speech or debate clause) 
to announce publicly each's condemnation of a president's mis-
conduct. If the senators may engage in such expression indi-
vidually, it is not clear why constitutionally they may not do so 
collectively. There is also nothing in the Constitution that bars a 
senator from getting a list of her colleagues' signatures on a 
document castigating the President and then entering that 
document into the Congressional Record. A censure is tanta-
mount to the latter action. While one could object that censure 
might be either a futile act politically or could be overused to 
frustrate or harass a president (or some other official), these are 
prudential not constitutional objections. The calculation of 
whether a censure is constitutional is separate and distinct from 
whether it makes political sense in any given case to use.36 
Lastly, President Clinton's acquittal hardly will qualify as a 
personal vindication. During the hearings, less than a handful of 
senators published or made public comments that did not in-
clude very strong condemnation of the President's misconduct. 
Those supporting the President's conviction condemned the 
President in the harshest of terms. Even the President's defend-
ers overwhelmingly condemned his behavior. They contended 
repeatedly that his acquittal should not be construed as fore-
closing other fora in which to hold him accountable for his mis-
conduct. This widespread condemnation of the President is 
likely to have some historical if not some constitutional signifi-
cance. For example, it might confirm that our constitutional sys-
tem includes many fora in which presidents can be held account-
able for their misdeeds, including impeachment, civil 
35. See, e.g., ABC Good Morning America (7:00 a.m. ET) (December 22, 1998) 
transcript #98122201-jol, available in LEXIS-NEXIS, News Directory, Transcripts. 
36. For a more elaborate discussion of censure, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Con-
stitutionality of Censure, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 33 (1999). 
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proceedings, criminal prosecution and trial, public opinion, me-
dia scrutiny, and history. As Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested, 
the lesson of Justice Chase's acquittal is that impeachment is an 
inappropriate mechanism for retaliating against a Supreme 
Court justice's (or, for that matter, any federal judge's) official 
rulings. The appropriate forum for dealing with a judge's mis-
takes on the bench is the judicial system, particularly through the 
appeals process. One popular lesson drawn from President 
Johnson's acquittal is that impeachment is an inappropriate 
mechanism for redressing a president's mistaken policy judg-
ments. Appropriate fora for dealing with errors of judgment in-
clude the court of public opinion, elections, and the judgment of 
history. Similarly, President Clinton's acquittal might signal to 
subsequent generations that his misconduct did not have a suffi-
ciently public dimension (nor harm) to warrant his removal from 
office. Nevertheless, other fora in which to hold him (or others 
who might engage in similar misconduct) accountable include 
public opinion, the judgment of history, possibly censure, and 
civil and criminal proceedings. 
What was true about the impeachment process in the nine-
teenth century, as explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
Grand Inquests, still might be true at the end of the twentieth 
century-that impeachment is a special mechanism for dealing 
with only certain kinds of misconduct, i.e., the most serious 
abuses of uniquely presidential powers, privileges, or trust. 
Moreover, foreclosing one fora of presidential accountability-
impeachment-does not necessarily mean that others, such as 
civil and criminal proceedings, the court of public opinion, his-
tory, perhaps censure, are unavailable. This is just one of the 
many possible lessons that might be drawn from President 
Clinton's impeachment and acquittal to be explored in the se-
quel to Chief Justice Rehnquist's Grand Inquests, regardless of 
who writes it. 
